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1. Introduction 
    Investors are increasingly attracted to China’s rapidly growing bond market. 
Following more than two decades of reforms aimed at developing the market and 
improving investor access, China’s bond market has become the second largest fixed 
income market in the world in 2020. 5  Among all debt instruments in China, 
government bonds and government-backed policy bank bonds (or agency bonds), 
which form China’s government bond market, have the largest market capitalization 
and trading volume.6 They serve as benchmarks for the pricing of credit bonds and play 
a critical role in facilitating monetary policy transmission. They are used by 
institutional investors as collaterals in repurchase transactions and are purchased by 
foreign investors for diversification benefits. 
Despite the importance of China’s government bond market, no studies have 
provided a comprehensive measure of its liquidity, which is a key determinant of    
price efficiency, monetary policy transmission and market development. Mo and 
Subrahmanyam (2020) propose a liquidity measure but their focus is on China’s 
corporate bond market. Other similar studies focus mostly on advanced economies and 
a few emerging markets.7 
In this paper, we construct a composite daily liquidity index of China’s 
government bond market over 2001-2019. We exploit rich daily trading information 
recorded by China Central Depository & Clearing Corporation (CCDC). We focus on 
popular price-based measures including bid-ask spread, the Amihud ratio, price 
dispersion, and high-low price spread, as well as some quantity-based measures, such 
as quote numbers, trade numbers and turnover ratio. To obtain the best quality of data 
on liquidity, we extract the on-the-run government bonds and agency bonds separately 
on each trading day and for each available maturity that reflect the most active trading 
 
5 China’s bond market capitalization reached USD14 trillion in mid-2020. Market size has grown by 
about 36 times from 2000 to 2020, compared with a 16-fold growth in the equity market capitalization 
during the same time. 
6 China’s bond market is a complex ecosystem made up of three underlying sub-sectors - onshore 
RMB-denominated bonds (CNY), offshore RMB-denominated bonds (CNH) and offshore US 
dollar-denominated bonds, each with fundamentally different characteristics. Our study is on onshore 
RMB-denominated treasury bonds and policy bank bonds (CNY). 
7 For example, see Adrian et al. (2017) on the US treasury market liquidity, Anderson and Lavoie (2004) 
on the liquidity in market for Canadian government bonds, Hoyos et al. (2020) on the Mexican 
government bond market, and Hameed et al. (2019) on the Malaysian corporate bond market. 
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of the day.8 On-the-run government and agency bonds are often the most in demand by 
institutional investors due to their high liquidity (when new benchmark bonds are 
issued, often the older “off-the-run” bonds are less traded). We combine all the 
different measures of liquidity to construct our composite liquidity indexes, as any 
single liquidity measure may only capture one dimension of the market (as in Hameed 
et al. (2019) and Adrian et al. (2017)). We do this either by averaging across different 
dimensions or by applying principal component analysis (PCA), which has the benefit 
of accounting for correlations of liquidity measures.  
We find from the composite index that market liquidity has improved since 2010 
and is currently high by historical standards. Before 2010, several domestic and global 
events (i.e. the SARS epidemic in 2003, the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 and 
the European debt crisis in 2009) were partly associated with low levels of market 
liquidity and significant liquidity swings. Market liquidity recovered notably and 
stabilized in the few years following the GFC, as China’s large-scale rescue packages 
kicked in. However, during 2013-2015 the liquidity condition slightly deteriorated as 
authorities embarked on financial deleveraging to contain financial risks. Since then it 
remained relatively stable until the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic in 
2020. 
We then use our liquidity indexes to examine what factors are associated with 
market liquidity in normal times and in times of extreme liquidity shortage. Using an 
event study, we show that domestic macro events and monetary policy changes have 
caused noticeable liquidity shocks. We complement the event study with formal and 
systematic econometric analysis, and find that the liquidity index is highly and 
consistently correlated with domestic funding liquidity and bond market volatility, but 
displays less correlation to global macrofinancial indicators. Using a regime-switching 
framework, we show that the correlation between market liquidity and the global 
factors becomes even weaker when we constrain our focus to periods of liquidity freeze 
only. 
 
8 This is similar to Hoyos et al. (2020), in which a liquidity index is formed using the on-the-run bond for 
each maturity on each trading day, instead of averaging across all trades and all maturities of the trading 
day. 
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Our study contributes to the policy discussion on the relationship between market 
size and market liquidity. Prior research on advanced countries’ bond markets suggests 
that market size matters for market liquidity and vice versa (for example McCauley and 
Remolona (2000)).9 The size of the whole market matters for liquidity because of 
economies of scale in market-making, i.e. in extracting information from quotes and 
positions taking. In turn, market liquidity can boost transactions by lowering trading 
costs, while market illiquidity may hamper the issuer’s access to debt financing in the 
primary market and limit turnover in the secondary market. Our findings suggest that 
China’s government bond market liquidity has increased steadily with its market size. 
However, liquidity may still be hindered by some constraints, as in the case of other 
less-developed financial markets.10 Among these constraints is the prevalent role of 
domestic banks with their traditionally conservative trading strategy (Schipke et al 
(2019)). These constraints can be likely overcome if the increase in foreign 
participation experienced in recent years is sustained in the future. Foreign ownership 
of Chinese government bonds has increased notably from only 2% in 2010 to about 
7.5% in the third quarter of 2020.11 The recent inclusion in major global bond indexes 
will further boost foreign participation of local currency debt toward a more 
diversified investor base, and improve bond market liquidity.12,13 Our liquidity index 
is useful for monitoring such changes and measuring the effects of future policy 
reforms and economic conditions.  
 
9 McCauley and Remolona (2000) show that the larger the outstanding stock of publicly issued central 
government debt, generally the higher the turnover ratio in cash and futures trading for a group of 11 
advanced economies using 1997 data. 
10 Typical constraints that affect liquidity in less-developed financial markets include holdings by 
government accounts, investors who do not trade actively, the trading microstructure, taxes, 
arrangements for repurchase, and clearing and settlement practices. Due to these factors market liquidity 
and market size may not always move proportionally (see for example Committee on the Global 
Financial System - BIS (1999) and Arvai and Heenan (2008)). 
11 According to https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/data-portal/, as of September 2020, foreign ownership 
of RMB-denominated Chinese government bonds rose to a record high with 22 months continuous 
inflow. In particular, foreign holdings of treasury rose to RMB 1.68 trillion, foreign holdings of policy 
bank bonds reached 0.54 RMB trillion based on data from CCDC. 
12 It also complements the Chinese yuan as a reserve currency in the special drawing rights (SDR) 
basket. 
13 In October 2020, China government bonds and policy bank bonds for the first time were added into the 
Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index. The index inclusion will eventually take China’s weight in 
the index to 6.03% - the 4th largest in the index and the only one from emerging markets.  FTSE 
announced that their FTSE World Government Bond Index will also include China government bonds 
starting from October 2021. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the government 
bond market and explains the reasons for our focus on the national interbank market. 
Section 3 describes the data and constructs the bond liquidity composite index. Section 
4 examines the effects of major macro and monetary events on liquidity movements, 
followed by Section 5 with an econometric analysis linking market liquidity to 
domestic and global financial and macro indicators. Sections 6 discusses policy 
implications, and Section 7 concludes.      
 
2. Government bond market in China 
China’s government bonds (CGB) or treasury bonds have been issued by the 
Ministry of Finance since 1964. Initially issued as a way of financing fiscal expenses, 
the treasury bonds are now the key instruments deployed by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) to implement monetary policy through repos and reverse repos. 
Government-backed agency bonds are quasi-sovereign bonds issued by China’s three 
policy banks: China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, who are government-backed entities. 
Agency bonds were introduced in 1994, and since then had become one of the largest 
segments in China’s bond market. To a certain extent, agency bonds enjoy even higher 
secondary market liquidity and are de facto (credit-) quasi-sovereign benchmark in 
practice.  
Despite many new developments in the whole bond market since mid-2000 (such 
as the introduction of Negotiable CDs in 2013 and the permission of issuance of local 
government bonds in 2015), treasury and agency bonds are still by far the largest 
constituent in China’s bond market in terms of both market capitalization and trading 
volumes. Figure 1 shows that, though with a declining trend, government and agency 
bonds still account for more than 30% of the total bond outstanding during the past 
three years on average. 14 They are the largest single constituent followed by local 
government bonds which account for 20% of the whole bond market capitalization. 
Figure 2 shows that agency bonds alone are one of the most actively traded constituents 
 
14 Local government bonds (LGB) are also called municipal bonds and are issued by local governments 
mainly to finance the local government infrastructure projects. The LGB market had been slowly 
trending up since 2008 before taking a dramatic surge in 2014. 
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in the last decade. The increasing market capitalization of government bonds over time 
is associated with an increasing trading volume, and declining price spread, as 
indicated by Figures 3-4.  
 
Figure 1: Market capitalization of 
China’s debt instruments 
Figure 2: Trading volume of China’s debt 
instruments 
 
 
The category “Others” in Figure 1 and Figure 2 includes Enterprise bonds, Corporate bonds, NCDs, 
MTN, SCPs, Central Bank bills, ABS, PPN, Financial bonds, and Convertible bonds etc.  
Source: WIND 
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Figure 3: Government bond market capitalization vs. turnover value 
 
Source: WIND 
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Like many other dual-listed bonds, government and agency bonds are traded both 
on the exchange market (i.e., the Shanghai Stock Exchange) and on the interbank 
market (i.e., China Foreign Exchange Trade system). Although the exchange market 
was established earlier for bond trading, the market power started to shift to the 
interbank market after 2000, where large state banks and national joint-stock 
commercial banks are primary players (Figure 5).15 Today government and agency 
bonds are far more traded in the interbank market than in the exchange market. In 2001, 
the cash bond trading volume in the interbank market was about twice the size of the 
exchange. In 2019, the cash bond trading reached RMB217.4 trillion in the interbank 
market, 25 times as large as that on the exchange. Meanwhile, government and agency 
bonds account for around 30% of the interbank bond (and note) trading, or about 29.8% 
of the total bond (and note) cash trading in the two markets. Given its prevalent status 
in bond trading, we apply the interbank bond data for our study.   
 
 
 
15  Commercial banks are not allowed to participate in the exchanges market. Such bond market 
segmentation is a special feature of China’s bond market, in which two markets – interbank market and 
exchanges market – come under the oversight of different regulation bodies (see also Amstad and He 
(2019)). Historically the exchanges market was established for bond issuance in 1990, however due to 
scandals of banks’ speculation in the stock market through bonds financing, a separate market – the 
interbank market – was established for banks in 1997 and gradually developed into a multi-participants 
market including banks, securities companies, insurance firms and mutual funds etc.  
Figure 4: Bond turnover value vs. price spread 
 
Source: WIND 
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3. The bond liquidity index  
In this section, we first describe the bond data, from which we construct seven 
bond liquidity measures and a bond liquidity composite index.    
 
3.1  Bond dataset   
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for government and agency bonds 
 
Variable Obs Mean Max Min Sd 
Closing price 84788 101.4 147.5 65.4 4.4 
Daily high price 84660 101.6 147.5 65.4 4.3 
Daily low price 84669 101.2 146.6 3.1 4.6 
Trading value 84788 1920 160000 0.1 5260 
Number of deals 83965 13.9 381 1 31.0 
Daily return (%) 84620 0.03 52.9 -32.7 1.2 
Turnover ratio 74712 2.6 232.3 0.0 5.5 
Best bid price 68876 101.0 226.6 76.6 4.4 
Best ask price 69072 101.9 138.0 2.7 4.4 
Number of quotes 84788 46.3 1440 0.0 77.9 
Residual maturity 84772 8.3 50 0.1 7.5 
Note: All the prices (in RMB) exclude accrued interest. The trading value is in the 
unit of 1 million RMB, and residual maturity is in the unit of year. Source: WIND 
 
 
We obtain the bond transactions data from the China Central Depository & Clear 
Corporation through the data vendor WIND. Daily government and policy bank bond 
Figure 5: Investor structure in China’s government 
bond market 
 
Notes: The category “Others” include Securities and Insurers, 
Non-financials and Overseas investors. Source: WIND 
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transaction data covering the period from 2001-June 2020 in the national interbank 
market are used. There are 475 government bonds in total and 2776 policy bank bonds 
once or currently traded in the interbank market.16 The original dataset keeps more than 
seven million daily records of these bonds from the day when they were launched to 
their maturity dates (even though they are not traded every day). We drop the 
non-trading day records and from the pool of trading-days records, we keep the 
on-the-run bonds, i.e., the bonds with the highest trading value on each trading day and 
for each remaining maturity (in the unit of 0.1 year). This leaves us with 84788 valid 
records. We select 11 transaction variables to construct 7 liquidity measures as shown 
below, which are further used to build the bond liquidity composite index. The 
summary statistics for the 11 transaction variables for on-the-run bonds are listed in 
Table 1. It shows that considerable differences exist among the sample of on-the-run 
bonds and that abnormal readings in daily prices and returns may also present.17  
 
3.2  Bond liquidity measures 
Following Hameed et al. (2019) and Hoyos et al. (2020), we construct 7 liquidity 
measures, which include: 
 Price measures: 
1. Bid-ask spread:  Defined as the best ask price – the best bid price.    
2. Amihud ratio: Calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily return to the 
trading value. A larger ratio is associated with a less liquid market.  
3. Price dispersion: Defined as the trading value weighted variance of closing price 
relative to the trading value weighted average of closing price, which can be 
simplified as (∑ 𝑤!𝑝!
")/(∑ 𝑤!𝑝!)! − ∑ 𝑤!𝑝!!! , where åi represents summation 
across observations, 𝑝! is the observation of the closing price, and 𝑤! is the 
weight for observation i. We use two-week rolling window to calculate the 
weighted variance.   
 
16 As a comparison, there are 465 government bonds and 38 policy bank bonds traded in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, 465 government bonds and 9 policy bank bonds traded in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
and 141 government bonds and 296 policy bank bonds traded in the OTC market.   
17 Nevertheless, we keep these observations in the sense that a large part of these outlier effects would be 
dropped in the process of index construction and aggregation. 
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4. Daily price amplitude: Defined as the daily high-low price spread relative to the 
average daily high and low prices.  
Quantity measures: 
5. Turnover ratio: We fill some missing values of the turnover ratio by using the 
ratio of trading value to the market capitalization of the relevant bonds. 
6. Trade number: The initial number of deals of on-the-run bonds deflated by the 
market capitalization of the corresponding bonds.18  
7. Quote number: The initial number of quotes of on-the-run bonds deflated by 
market capitalization of the corresponding bonds.19  
 At the first step, we simply calculate daily sub-measures at each maturity 
according to the above definition. Table 2 lists the mean of the 7 sub-measures for 
selected maturities with standard deviations in parentheses. It appears that bonds with 
short maturities (i.e., less than 10 years) are more liquid than bonds with long 
maturities (i.e., more than 10 years). In terms of quantity measures, the 10-year bonds 
become the most liquid ones among all the bonds. 
Table 2: Mean of price- and quantity-liquidity sub-measures at major maturities 
Variable Y1  Y2  Y5  Y10  Y20  Y30 
Bid-ask spread 0.19  0.39  1.20  0.61  0.66  3.68 
 (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.70)  (0.87)  (0.31)  (2.18) 
Amihud ratio 0.000  0.005  0.002  0.003  0.009  0.003 
 (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.01) 
Price dispersion 0.001  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.010  0.002 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.01) 
Price amplitude 0.002  0.003  0.005  0.008  0.009  0.009 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Turnover ratio 7.62  7.55  6.80  14.66  6.68  10.00 
 (14.03)  (17.05)  (16.04)  (22.76)  (13.49)  (17.45) 
Trade number 0.045  0.05  0.052  0.154  0.05  0.075 
 (0.081)  (0.126)  (0.103)  (0.221)  (0.099)  (0.11) 
Quote number 0.131  0.278  0.075  0.161  0.014  0.019 
 (0.227)  (0.846)  (0.109)  (0.338)  (0.022)  (0.062) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: Authors’ estimates 
    At the second step, we take a simple average across maturities on each trading 
day to obtain daily liquidity measures. Summary statistics for these liquidity measures 
are listed in Table 3. The bid-ask spread has much fewer observations than other 
 
18 We set Trade number to be missing if the initial number of deals is recorded as 0 in the dataset when 
constructing the composite liquidity index. 
19 We set Quote number to be missing if the initial number of quotes is recorded as 0 in the dataset 
when constructing the composite liquidity index.   
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measures, which leads to the composite bond liquidity index obtained by the PCA 
method shorter than that obtained by the simple average method.     
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for daily liquidity measures  
Variable Obs Mean Max Min Sd 
Bid-ask spread 3104 1.04 8.41 0 0.79 
Amihud ratio 3902 0.02 10.11 0 0.18 
Price dispersion 3928 0.04 2.64 0 0.14 
Price amplitude 3620 0.01 0.41 0 0.02 
Turnover ratio 3948 2.43 50.07 0 2.32 
Trade number 3948 0.35 5.272 0 0.509 
Quote number 3948 1.06 26.112 0 1.952 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
    Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for daily bond liquidity measures. The 
quote number and trade number are highly correlated while other pair-wise 
correlations are relatively low. All price- and quantity-measures are positively 
correlated among themselves, but negatively correlated between them most times. The 
correlation matrix provides useful information that correlations among some liquidity 
measures should be controlled for when constructing the liquidity composite index, 
and our PCA approach fits to address the issue.  
 
Table 4: Correlations between liquidity measures 
 
 Bid-ask 
spread 
Amihud 
ratio 
Price 
dispersion 
Price 
amplitude 
Turnover 
ratio 
Trades Quotes 
Bid ask spread 1       
Amihud ratio 0.20 1      
Price dispersion 0.43 0.32 1     
Price amplitude 0.31 0.20 0.39 1    
Turnover ratio -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 0.02 1   
Trades number 0.17 -0.09 -0.19 -0.10 0.34 1  
Quotes number 0.10 -0.06 -0.17 -0.12 0.23 0.86 1 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
 
3.3 Composite liquidity index 
    We apply the principal component analysis (PCA) to build the composite 
liquidity index, accounting for correlations of measures by effectively assigning each 
measure its weight. Specifically, the PCA is aimed at conducting the Eigenvalue 
decomposition of the observed covariance matrix of the initial liquidity measures such 
that, the resultant Eigenvectors (i.e., the loading vectors for the principal components) 
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are mutually orthogonal. Each principal components (PC) is a linear combination of 
the initial liquidity measures.20 For instance, the ith principal component is  
PCi = ai1x1+ai2x2+…+ainxn                    (1) 
where xj (j=1,2,…n) denotes the jth initial liquidity measure with its loading aij 
(j=1,2,…n) . The composite liquidity index represented by the first i principal 
components is simply read as  
 Compindex = (k1PC1 + k2PC2+…+kiPCi )         (2) 
where ki is the weight for the ith principal component, which is simply the share of the 
ith ordered Eigenvalue in the total of the first i Eigenvalues. The explanatory power of 
principal components is recorded in Table 5. We take the first 5 principal components 
to construct the composite index according to Equation (2), as they are able to account 
for 92% of the total variance (Eigenvalues) of all principal components.21 
 
Table 5：Variance explained by principal components  
Component Eigenvalue Proportion 
Comp1 2.223 0.318 
Comp2 1.844 0.263 
Comp3 0.924 0.132 
Comp4 0.809 0.116 
Comp5 0.6 0.086 
Comp6 0.476 0.068 
Comp7 0.123 0.018 
Source: Authors' estimates 
    The composite liquidity index obtained by PCA is presented in Figure 6. Note 
that higher (and positive) value of liquidity index points to more illiquid market 
condition, and lower (and negative) value of the index points to more liquid market 
condition. Figure 6 shows that (1) the liquidity index was far more volatile before 
2010; (2) market liquidity improved significantly since 2010, which could be due to 
authorities’ liquidity injection after the global financial crisis; (3) liquidity condition 
 
20 Before conducting the exercise, we multiply -1 to all three quantity measures, so that larger (smaller) 
values of the seven measures all point to more illiquid (liquid) market condition. Then we normalize all 
seven measures into zero-mean and unity-variance ones (Z-score) before aggregation.  
21 In line with Altman (2011) to rank the relative importance of explanatory variables, it can be verified 
based on Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors that, the bid-ask spread, the price amplitude, and the turnover 
ratio are (almost equally) the most important contributors to the composite liquidity volatility, to which 
each contributing around 21%-23%. Contribution of the price dispersion is around 18%, followed by the 
Amihud ratio of 11%. Contributions of trades and quotes are small, around 2%-4%. An alternative way is 
to construct price and quantity indexes separately using PCA, and then aggregate the two sub-indexes 
with PCA again to obtain a composite liquidity index. The composite index constructed this way is 
smoother due to double “averaging” of liquidity measures. It also gives more weight to the Amihud ratio 
and the price amplitude. 
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further improved so far in 2020, on global monetary easing after the outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed earlier, it lacks observations before 2006.22 
Alternatively, we take the simple average of 7 liquidity measures to construct the 
composite index and show it in Figure 7.  
 
Fiure 6: Composite liquidity index by 
PCA method 
Figure 7: Composite liquidity index by 
simple average method 
    
Source: Authors’ estimates Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
   In the following two sections, we use the liquidity index obtained by the PCA 
method for our analysis, as this index is less distorted by missing values and can 
better address the interconnectedness among liquidity measures.  
 
4. Macro events and liquidity conditions: a brief overview  
To study liquidity swings of the government bond market, we conduct a simple 
event study, examining several episodes associated with large liquidity stress or easing. 
Since the augmented Dickey-Fuller test does not detect the unit root of the liquidity 
index, we propose an AR(4) process with calendar effects to fit the index and calculate 
its predicted value, according to sample (partial) autocorrelations:23  
 
22 By this method, the observations of the composite index would be fewer than what would be 
obtained by taking simple average across 7 liquidity measures due to missing values of each measure.  
23 Liquidity developments are subject to calendar effects such as the Chinese New Year effect, varying 
both according to the day of the week and the month of the year. Alternatively, a process of volatility may 
be added to form ARCH or GARCH model to address time varying volatility, but that does not change 
the coefficient estimates in general. Also, one may use a one-week window to filter out some noises of 
the liquidity index first before estimating the AR process. But that does not change the episodes of 
liquidity distress or easing. 
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!&' + 𝜀# (3) 
where Mi and Wi are dummies for month-of-the-year and day-of-the-week effects 
respectively. As defined, a large positive gap between the index value and its predicted 
value suggests an episode with liquidity stress, while a large negative gap indicates an 
episode with liquidity easing. Figures 8-12 below illustrate five episodes in a 7-day 
window, where each episode occurs at t = 0. Several other macrofinancial indicators 
are also plotted in order to examine their potential co-movements with the liquidity 
index. Their definitions are listed in Table A1 in the appendix. All the values of 
variables are normalized to 1 if they are positive (and -1 if they are negative) at t = 0.  
We find that some of the significant liquidity changes could be attributed to 
extreme global shocks, while others are often associated with domestic (monetary and 
fiscal) policy shocks. Figure 8 covers the episode of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
during the global financial crisis. Liquidity stress loomed before the announcement of 
bankruptcy and continued into the second day of the announcement before the situation 
improved and stabilized. For this particular event, the US financial market liquidity 
stress (represented by MOVE, VIX and USTED) appears to have a quick contagious 
effect on Chinese financial market, causing a large swing in the domestic bond and the 
RMB foreign exchange markets (i.e. CGBYLDV and CNYIMPV). The relatively 
quick  rebound of market liquidity was partially due to the swift monetary policy 
responses, including lowering the required reserve ratio (RRR) in September 2008 for 
the first time in two years.24 
Figure 9 covers the European debt crisis in December 2009, marked by a 
downgrade of Greek sovereign debt by both Fitch and Moody’s. The initial impact on 
domestic liquidity was high, but the situation alleviated after two days. Meanwhile, 
both the RMB foreign exchange and money markets were staying put, so were the US 
and global markets, suggesting the bond liquidity stress in the two days was mainly due 
to a panic.  
Figure 10 depicts the Chinese banking liquidity crunch in June 2013, evidenced by 
a rapid rise in the interbank overnight lending rates to a high of 30% from its usual rate 
 
24 During mid-2006 to September 2008, China went through a tightening cycle with the PBoC increasing 
the RRR 18 times. In September 2008, after a series of negative financial events (e.g. the announcement 
of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the takeover of AIG by the US Federal Reserve) struck the US 
financial market, the PBoC announced to lower the RRR. By the end of 2008 RRR had been lowered for 
four times. 
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of less than 3%. The sharp rise in the interbank funding cost drove liquidity index up 
significantly on impact and over the following three days. The shortfall in interbank 
credit occurred shortly after the US tapering in May 2013, though the US liquidity 
indicators did not show much distress in the episode.  
Figure 11, on the other hand, illustrates a considerable improvement in liquidity 
following the launch of Bond Connect in July 2017, which enables offshore investors to 
buy and sell bonds in China’s interbank market and hold these securities in their Hong 
Kong custodian’s accounts. The event led to an increase in bond liquidity in the 
seven-day window, though much of the effect may appear in the medium to longer term. 
The episode did not appear to have an impact on other segments of the domestic 
market.  
Figure 12 presents a temporary shortfall in bond liquidity on 29 May 2020, when it 
was close to the deadline for corporate tax payment. The corporate tax payment along 
with new government bond issuance in May drained market liquidity, driving up 
money market rates. However, the PBoC conducted a RMB300 billion reverse Repo on 
the same day, effectively lowering money market rates and easing bond market 
liquidity in the following days.   
               
5. Explaining liquidity index variation  
Based on findings of how various macrofinancial indicators co-move with 
government bond market liquidity in the above event study, in this section we 
investigate the driving force of market liquidity in a more systematic way using 
econometric analysis. We first perform OLS regressions linking our constructed 
liquidity index to domestic and global macrofinancial indicators, most of which are 
already used in the event study in the previous section. We then apply the regime 
switching model to estimate the likelihood of liquidity stress and examine how it is 
affected by these macrofinancial indicators.  
Following Hoyos et al. (2020), we categorize financial and macro indicators into 
domestic funding liquidity indicators, domestic financial market volatility indicators, 
the US and global macrofinancial indicators. (see Table A1 and A2 in the appendix for 
detailed definitions and correlations of these variables).25  We use each group of 
 
25 Table A2 shows that three U.S. indicators are highly correlated with each other, and are highly 
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indicators as independent variables before putting them together in regressions.    
Figure 8: Lehman bankruptcy on 16 
September 2008 
Figure 9: Greece sovereign debt 
downgraded on 8 December 2009 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
Figure 10: Chinese banking liquidity 
crisis on 20 June 2013 
Figure 11: Launch of Bond Connect 
Scheme on 3 July 2017 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
correlated with domestic stock volatility. Other pairwise correlations are relatively low, but they can still 
affect coefficient estimates as shown in the following regressions. 
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5.1  Regression evidence: OLS 
 
Market liquidity variations are often associated with stress in funding liquidity, as 
argued by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Tighter funding liquidity will push up 
the borrowing costs, and lenders are less likely to lend. Government bonds are often 
used in the repo market as high-quality collateral. A less active funding market and 
rising borrowing cost will drive up demand for holding government bonds as safe assets, 
and thereby reduce bond trading and market liquidity. Column (1) in Table 6 shows that 
tighter domestic funding liquidity (or tighter money market condition) indeed is 
associated with lower bond market liquidity, with the coefficient of both 1-month 
Chinese treasury-repo spread (CNTR) and Chinese treasury-IRS spread (CNTS) being 
(significantly) positive. These two funding liquidity indicators explain 48% of the 
liquidity index variation.26 
 
26 Broker and dealer’s leverage, as suggested by Adrian et al. (2017), also measures domestic funding 
 
Table 6: Factors to explain domestic government bond market liquidity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Domestic 
funding 
liquidity 
 
Domestic 
financial 
market 
volatility 
U.S. and global 
macrofinancial 
indicators 
All indicators 
CNTR 0.033***    0.018 0.019* 0.022* 
 (3.003)    (1.633) (1.661) (1.907) 
CNTS 0.030    0.144*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 
 (1.317)    (5.909) (6.055) (6.125) 
 
CGBYLDV  0.707***   0.530*** 0.603*** 0.616*** 
  (21.055)   (13.580) (14.428) (15.806) 
CNSSEV  0.002**   0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 
  (2.465)   (2.641) (2.403) (1.716) 
CNYIMPV  0.044***   0.017** 0.028*** 0.024*** 
  (7.218)   (2.504) (4.068) (3.390) 
 
USTED(-1)   0.460***  0.345***   
   (13.545)  (12.049)   
MOVE(-1)   0.002***   0.001***  
   (4.324)   (2.757)  
VIX(-1)   0.002    0.004*** 
   (1.421)    (4.052) 
BrentR(-1)    -0.007*** -0.004* -0.005** -0.004 
    (-2.711) (-1.707) (-2.005) (-1.566) 
CESIGL(-1)    -0.003*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** 
    (-8.425) (-1.778) (-3.862) (-2.361) 
N 2731 2971 2205 2251 2020 2064 2064 
Adj R2 0.48 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.63 0.60 0.61 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source: Authors’ estimates 
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Domestic funding liquidity is shown to be highly relevant with market liquidity, 
which prompts us to check the second moment effect of domestic financial market 
movement on government bond market liquidity. Presumably in times of stress, tighter 
funding liquidity could be caused by various financial market volatility shocks. 
Column (2) in Table 6 shows that high domestic government bond market volatility 
(CGBYLDV), equity market volatility (CNSSEV) and option-implied CNY volatility 
(CNYIMPV) are all related to low government bond market liquidity, as Adrian et al. 
(2017) find in the US Treasury market.27  
We test the spillover effects of the US and global market movement (with one-day 
lag for causality consideration) on liquidity condition of domestic government bond 
market. As shown in column (3) and (4) in Table 6, high US TED spread (USTED), 
bond market volatility (MOVE) and stock futures volatility (VIX) contribute to low 
domestic government bond market liquidity, while higher oil returns (BRENTR, 
presumably pushed up by demand) and positive Citi global index (CESIGL) suggest a 
good global economic environment, leading to a better domestic bond liquidity 
condition. 
Finally, we combine all groups of indicators and show that all factors together 
explain more than 60% of bond liquidity variation (columns (5)-(7)). The coefficient 
sign and significance of these factors remain except for the oil price movement, whose 
effect seems to be absorbed by other variables. 
Considering the potential structural break around 2009 when bond liquidity 
started to improve and volatility began to decline (Figures 6-7), we re-do our regression 
analysis using post-2009 sub-sample (see results in Table A3 in the appendix). While 
 
liquidity. When funding liquidity is squeezed, brokers and dealers find it more difficult to borrow to 
finance their business, which in turn reduces market liquidity. Consistent with this argument, we find that 
higher broker’s leverage is associated with higher market liquidities when leverage is the single 
explanatory variable in the full sample. However, the regression using post-2009 sub-sample shows the 
role of brokers and dealers in the bond market becomes weaker. 
27 A few notes on the variable selection: (1) A good substitute for CGB yield volatility is the yield 
volatility of China Development Bank bond (CDBYLDV), which exerts similar significant effects on 
market liquidity. Note that we do not include them together in the same regression due to their high 
correlation of 0.82. (2) The implied volatility of CNY is found to be more significant in explaining the 
bond market liquidity than CNY historical volatility. (3) We prefer CNSSEV to CNETFV as the stock 
volatility measure because the former covers longer horizon. (4) We use the first moment Brent oil price 
movement instead of Brent oil price volatility because of the estimated coefficient for the former is more 
stable in regressions. (5) We do not include Citi US economic surprises or Citi emerging market 
economic surprises mainly due to their high correlations with the Citi global economic surprises 
(CESIGL). Each of them has coefficient sign similar to CESIGL in regressions.   
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domestic factors are still shown to be the main drivers of market liquidity, the global 
economic condition CESGIL and US bond and futures market volatility seem to play a 
less important role.28  
To sum up, the regression results suggest that government bond market liquidity is 
mainly and consistently driven by domestic funding conditions, its correlation with US 
and global factors is to a lesser extent and mostly before the global financial crisis. 
 
5.2 Regime switching model  
Market liquidity tends to switch abruptly between different levels (Figures 6-7) 
and may exhibit different correlations during different “regimes”, which could be 
characterized in a regime switching framework. In this section we focus on the role 
played by various determinants particularly during liquidity shortages. Following 
Hoyos et al. (2020) and IMF (2015), we first use a dynamic Markov Switching model 
to estimate the regime of liquidity condition as follows: 
Compindex = 𝑎)
* + 𝜀#
*                           (4) 
with 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝛿*) and k =1, 2, 3 refers to high, mild, and low liquidity condition 
respectively.29 The estimated probability of low liquidity is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: Probability of low liquidity 
 
Note: The estimated probability of low liquidity 
shown in Figure 13 ranges between 0.014 and 0.891. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
28 In particular, VIX is no longer significant post 2009, and the global positive shock (CESIGL) reverses 
its sign. In fact, a positive sign remains even when CESIGL is the single explanatory variable, which may 
be related to domestic counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies. We leave it for future investigation.  
29 The joint hypotheses of equality of a and δ between any two states are rejected at 1% significant 
level by the Chi-square tests, suggesting the 3-state assumption is more reasonable than a 2-state 
assumption. The parameters for the three states are listed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
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As expected, the highest liquidity stress identified occurred in periods that 
coincide with several major macro events: in March 2007-March 2008 the global 
economy was headed towards imminent financial crisis; in June 2008-February 2009  
banking giants Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers failed one after another; and finally 
during March 2009-April 2011 market liquidity became extremely volatile when debt 
crisis spread across European economies.30 Despite an overall high liquidity situation 
in the first half of 2020 (see also Figures 6-7), the probability of liquidity stress is 
occasionally high. 
 
Table 7: Factors to explain low liquidity probability obtained from regime switching model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Domestic 
funding 
liquidity 
 
Domestic 
financial 
market 
volatility 
U.S. and global 
macrofinancial 
indicators 
 
 
All indicators 
 
 
CNTR 0.025***    0.023*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 
 (3.326)    (2.801) (3.224) (2.836) 
CNTS -0.038**    0.021 0.023 0.021 
 (-2.454)    (1.161) (1.321) (1.205) 
CGBYLDV  0.289***   0.229*** 0.270*** 0.243*** 
  (12.665)   (8.008) (9.120) (8.780) 
CNSSEV  -0.002***   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (-3.665)   (-4.089) (-4.062) (-3.256) 
CNYIMPV  0.027***   0.029*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
  (6.467)   (5.900) (6.616) (7.009) 
USTED(-1)   0.071***  -0.048**   
   (2.959)  (-2.275)   
MOVE(-1)   -0.000   -0.002***  
   (-0.496)   (-4.751)  
VIX(-1)   0.001    -0.004*** 
   (1.567)    (-5.175) 
BrentR(-1)    -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
    (-0.004) (0.075) (-0.161) (-0.624) 
CESIGL(-1)    -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
    (-10.670) (-6.604) (-6.204) (-7.819) 
N 2731 2971 2158 2204 1999 2043 2043 
Adj R2 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
We then examine the role of various macrofinancial indicators in liquidity stress 
using the same specification as in Table 6 with the estimated probability of low 
liquidity as dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 7. Several points are 
 
30 Figure 13 also revealed some heightened liquidity volatility but not associated with those “renowned” 
events: August 2013 –April 2014, December 2014 – April 2015, and Dec 2016 – April 2017, when the 
situation in general is not as intense as during the period of those major events. 
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worth highlighting. First, the combined explanatory power of all the factors is still 
high, explaining 42% of the variation in the probability of liquidity stress. Although in 
normal times heightened domestic treasury-IRS swap spread (CNTS) is associated 
with low liquidity, this relationship breaks down. Similar findings also appear with 
domestic stock market volatility (CNSSEV), whose relationship with market liquidity 
is reversed during liquidity stress. In terms of US indicators, only the coefficient of 
the US Ted spread is positive and significant when they are the exclusive explanatory 
variables in Regression (3). Furthermore, the sign of all their coefficients becomes 
negative in Regressions (5)- (7), suggesting that less spillovers from the US market 
are displayed in the event of domestic liquidity shortages, in the sense that domestic 
market liquidity tends not to co-move with the US financial market condition. The 
global variables perform pretty much the same as in the baseline regressions.31       
 
6. Comments on government bond market liquidity  
The composite liquidity index suggests market liquidity of China’s government 
and agency bonds largely remained stable in the last decade, highlighting a lack of 
government bonds trading proportional to their market capitalization. As for 
comparison, the market capitalization of policy bank bonds is slightly lower than that 
of government bonds in 2019, their trading volume is more than twice the size of 
government bonds (Figures 1-2). One major reason is the prevalent role of domestic 
banks in the investor structure (Figure 5), with their trading style being traditionally 
conservative. Meanwhile, various funds are keen to trade agency bonds rather than 
government bonds, because they can enjoy advantageous tax treatment toward agency 
bond trading.32 Although the government bonds and these agency bonds are almost 
perfectly substitutable - the latter provides relatively high yields with almost no 
default risks and this makes them more attractive.    
 
31 We also use the 5-day moving average of the liquidity index to estimate the state probabilities to 
account for potential bias estimates due to noises from the “raw” liquidity index. The low liquidity 
probability for smoothed index is shown in Figure A1 and the corresponding regression results are 
reported in Table A5 in the appendix. The change in low liquidity probability turns out to be less 
intense than in Figure 13. The regression results are largely in line with that using the raw liquidity 
index.  
32 See the online article, “Why the liquidity of government bonds is lower than agency bonds?”, 
http://bond.jrj.com.cn/2017/07/07111322712664.shtml, July 2017. 
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Measures that encourage foreign participation and foreign capital inflows could 
help to improve government bond liquidity. Although international investors were 
allowed to enter Chinese capital markets in 2002，it was only after restrictions on 
foreign investment were further relaxed in 2016 and Bond Connect was launched in 
2017 that the effect of international investment on the trend of bond liquidity became 
significant (Figure 15).33 Looking forward, a prolonged situation of global low rates 
and a strong domestic currency are likely to attract more capital inflows, contributing 
to higher government bond market liquidity.34   
 
 
Figure 15: Bond holdings by international investors vs. the 
bond liquidity index 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
On the other hand, there is still room to increase the pool of government bonds to 
accommodate potential investors in the long run for liquidity improvement, given that 
China’s GDP has reached two thirds of the US’, while the capitalization of 
outstanding Chinese government bonds is around one fifth of the size of US 
government bonds.  
            
 
33 In early 2019, international investors are also allowed to trade domestic futures and option products 
besides equities and bonds, so that international investors are able to construct their RMB-denominated 
portfolios from a wide range of asset products. 
34 Some government bonds have reached yield of 3% recently in this low interest rate environment. They 
offer higher yield than developed markets while exhibiting low volatility vs. major bonds globally (UBS, 
2020).    
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2014-06 2015-04 2016-02 2016-12 2017-10 2018-08
Compindex （LHS）
Overseas investors （RHS）
10 per. Mov. Avg. (Compindex （LHS）)
%
 
 23 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the liquidity of China’s government and agency bonds during 
the past two decades by constructing a bond liquidity index based on price and 
quantity measures. We find that bond market liquidity condition after 2010 appears to 
be better than before. Market liquidity is mostly driven by domestic monetary and 
financial conditions, but to a lesser degree by the US and global factors. Compared 
with the US bond market, the size of China’s government bond market is still small 
and the foreign participation rate is still low. Recent inclusions of Chinese bond into 
major global bond indexes underpin the growing demand from foreign investors as 
China’s financial market continues to open up. In July 2020, the authorities approved 
to connect the interbank and the exchange bond markets, in a move to unify domestic 
bond markets and eliminate price disparities across the trading houses. These 
measures would further improve domestic government bond market liquidity down 
the road. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition of domestic and global macrofinancial indicators  
Variable                  Definition 
Starting 
Date 
 
Volatility in domestic financial market  
CN bond mark volatility 
historical (CGBYLDV) 
Annualized 30-day yield volatility of 10-year 
government bonds 
2002 Jan   
CN bond mark volatility 
historical (CDBYLDV) 
Annualized 30-day yield volatility of 10-year China 
development bank bonds 
 2002 Jan   
CN equity market volatility 
historical (CNSSEV) 
Annualized 30-day volatility of SSE composite stock 
index  
2001 Nov   
CN equity market volatility 
implied (CNETFV) 
CBOE China ETF Volatility (30-day option implied 
volatility) 
2011 Mar   
CN FX market volatility 
historical (CNYV) 
Annualized 30-day standard deviation of CNYUSD 
exchange rates 
2001 Feb  
CNY option implied volatility 
(CNYIMPV)  
Implied volatility of 3-month on-the-money CNYUSD 
option 
2002 Dec  
            Volatility / funding liquidity variables in the US financial market  
US bond market volatility 
(MOVE)  
MOVE index 2000 Jan   
US CBOE volatility index 
(VIX) 
CBOE volatility index 1999 Dec  
US TED spread (USTED)  3-month LIBOR minus 3-month T-bill yield 1999 Dec  
       Domestic funding liquidity variables   
CN treasury-swap spread 
(CNTS) 
1-year interest rate swap rate of FR007 minus 1-year 
government bond yield  
2008 Feb   
CN treasury-repo spread 
(CNTR) 
1-month interbank repo rate minus 1-month 
government bond yield  
2002 Jan   
Global macro variables  
Brent oil futures movement 
(BRENTR) 
Percentage change in price for Brent oil futures  1999 Dec   
Citi global economic surprise 
index (CESIGL) 
Weighted average of 3-month standard deviations of 
economic surprises 
2003 Jan   
Sources: Bloomberg, CBOE, Chinabond, Shanghai Stock Exchange, CFETS, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis   
 
  
Table A2: Correlations of domestic and global macrofinancial indicators 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  (10) 
(1) CNTR 1.000 
(2) CNTS 0.196 1.000 
(3)CGBYLDV 0.034 0.135 1.000 
(4) CNSSEV 0.233 0.158 0.266 1.000 
(5) CNYIMPV 0.169 0.382 0.127 0.108 1.000 
(6) USTED 0.182 0.253 0.385 0.390 0.298 1.000 
(7) MOVE 0.174 0.034 0.417 0.533 0.012 0.640 1.000 
(8) VIX 0.170 0.130 0.403 0.443 0.150 0.626 0.727 1.000 
(9) BRENTR 0.007 0.014 0.044 0.041 0.012 0.025 0.028 0.099 1.000 
(10) CESIGL 0.136 0.332 0.202 0.173 0.118 0.288 0.101 0.310 0.009 1.000 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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Table A3: Factors to explain bond market liquidity: post-2009 subsample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CNTR 0.041***    0.021** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (4.982)    (2.375) (2.789) (2.795) 
CNTS 0.143***    0.146*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
 (8.077)    (7.344) (7.396) (7.407) 
CGBYLDV  0.445***   0.398*** 0.416*** 0.413*** 
  (14.844)   (11.625) (11.707) (12.196) 
CNSSEV  0.003***   0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (4.644)   (4.760) (4.364) (4.167) 
CNYIMPV  0.000   0.002 0.004 0.003 
  (0.082)   (0.314) (0.637) (0.524) 
USTED(-1)   0.325***  0.200***   
   (6.543)  (4.816)   
MOVE(-1)   0.003***   -0.000  
   (6.228)   (-0.154)  
VIX(-1)   -0.004***    0.000 
   (-3.245)    (0.476) 
BrentR(-1)    -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
    (-2.306) (-2.084) (-2.118) (-2.031) 
CESIGL(-1)    0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
    (8.766) (5.540) (6.102) (6.175) 
N 2460 2523 1872 1913 1818 1859 1859 
Adj R2 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.55 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
Table A4: Parameters for 3 liquidity states 
  
  
State 1 
High liquidity  
State 2 
Mild liquidity  
State 3 
Low liquidity 
a -0.39  -0.041  0.276 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.052) 
δ     0.140  0.182  1.016 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.037) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
Table A5: Factors to explain low liquidity probability using moving average liquidity index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CNTRL 0.024***    0.025*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
 (3.609)    (3.573) (4.123) (3.627) 
CNTS -0.038***    0.023 0.025* 0.023 
 (-2.785)    (1.474) (1.662) (1.510) 
CGBYLDV  0.287***   0.229*** 0.279*** 0.246*** 
  (14.388)   (9.284) (10.916) (10.327) 
CNSSEV  -0.002***   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (-4.207)   (-4.757) (-4.606) (-3.673) 
CNYIMPV  0.027***   0.030*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
  (7.514)   (6.922) (7.821) (8.205) 
USTED(-1)   0.081***  -0.048***   
   (3.810)  (-2.623)   
MOVE(-1)   -0.000   -0.002***  
   (-0.899)   (-6.084)  
VIX(-1)   0.001*    -0.004*** 
   (1.662)    (-6.184) 
BrentR(-1)    0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
    (0.204) (0.350) (0.025) (-0.507) 
CESIGL(-1)    -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
    (-11.925) (-7.379) (-6.799) (-8.779) 
N 2731 2971 2158 2204 1999 2043 2043 
Adj R2 0.44 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Probability of low liquidity with moving 
averaged liquidity index 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
